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Licensing of a lower-cost production process to an asymmetric 
Cournot duopoly 
 
Dimitry Rtischev 
Gakushuin University 
 
An outside inventor of a new production process seeks to license it to Cournot 
duopolists which have unequal ex ante costs.  Distinguishing “leading-edge” 
innovations (new cost below both firms’ costs) from “catch-up” innovations (new cost 
between the two firms’ costs), we compare the equilibria of two license-selling 
mechanisms: exclusive license auction and non-exclusive price-setting.  In contrast 
to the often-studied case of an innovation that reduces the cost of any licensee by the 
same amount, we show that licensing of a new process may attenuate the ex ante cost 
asymmetry, allow the inefficient firm to leapfrog its competitor, and raise the 
licensee’s net profits. 
 
JEL classification: D45, L13, L24, O31  
Keywords: cost-reducing innovation, technology licensing 
 
1. Introduction 
 The modern theory of licensing of a cost-reducing innovation uses 
game-theoretic models to analyze the interaction among an inventor and potential 
licensees who compete in a downstream market.  The externalities that the innovation 
generates among the downstream competitors makes the upstream trade in technology a 
much more complex and subtle affair than trade in a typical market for procuring inputs.  
After more than twenty years of increasingly elaborate models, the theory has examined 
and clarified many issues that influence the structure, pricing, and allocation of licenses, 
including royalties vs. fixed-fees, auctions vs. price-setting, inside or outside inventors, 
and exclusivity.  However, the conception of what constitutes “a cost-reducing 
innovation” remains elementary.  Specifically, most licensing theory developed so far 
has focused on identical firms and assumed that a given cost-reducing technology can 
bring down unit cost by the same amount at any firm that licenses it.  One goal of this 
paper is to propose alternative conceptions of a cost-reducing innovation that may 
plausibly arise in a manufacturing industry and engender distinct strategic consequences.  
A second goal is to explore one of those alternatives in detail and compare the results 
with previous findings.  A third goal is to demonstrate that doing away with the usual 
assumption that firms are identical leads to substantively richer as well as more realistic 
models of technology licensing. 
We begin in the next section by attempting to ground the conception of a 
cost-reducing innovation in specific conditions that may arise in a typical 
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manufacturing industry, without assuming that firms have identical costs.  This leads 
us to interpret the prevalent conception of a cost-reducing innovation as an innovation 
that eliminates one step in the production process, and to identify other plausible kinds 
of cost-reducing innovations.  Focusing on an innovation which constitutes an 
entirely new way of producing the downstream good, we proceed to specify a duopoly 
model in Section 3 and use it to analyze the sale of a new-process license via an 
auction (Section 4) and via price-setting (Section 5).  In contrast to step-eliminating 
innovations, we show that licensing of a new process can attenuate the ex ante cost 
asymmetry and allow the inefficient firm to leapfrog its competitor.  We also show 
that an exclusive-license auction does not necessarily earn the inventor more revenue 
than non-exclusive price-setting. 
 
2. Alternative conceptions of a cost-reducing innovation 
 A very general conception of licensing has been put forth in Katz and Shapiro’s 
seminal paper “How to license intellectual property” (1986).  Although they conduct 
much of their discussion in the specific context of an inventor licensing an innovation to 
an oligopoly, they stress that their model applies to the licensing of any “intangible 
property” (IP) that satisfies the following conditions 
1. there is only one licensor, and it has access to an infinite supply of the IP at zero 
marginal cost (i.e., development costs have been sunk) 
2. there are several identical potential licensees, each of which has use for at most one 
unit of the IP 
3. the profit of the licensee (gross of the license fee) is higher than the profit of a 
non-licensee 
4. the profit of a non-licensee decreases as more of its competitors acquire licenses 
(i.e., by becoming a licensee, a firm imposes a negative externality on a 
non-licensee) 
 Katz and Shapiro stress than these assumptions describe not only the case of 
licensing of a cost-reducing technology but also the licensing of an industry standard or 
the sale of access to some central facility.  Notably, the authors abstain from specifying 
a model of how potential licensees compete in the downstream market and how 
obtaining access to the IP affects a firm’s competitive standing.  Remaining at a high 
level of abstraction, Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Shapiro (1985) derive interesting 
general results including:  
(i) an inventor obtains more licensing revenue via auctioning off a limited number 
of licenses than by setting a price and letting any interested firm buy, and 
(ii) licensing that maximizes inventor’s revenue leaves both licensees and 
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non-licensees with less net profit than ex ante (i.e., the inventor appropriates 
some of the licensee’s ex ante profit).  
 
These results have been confirmed and elaborated in the context of specific 
models of competition among potential licensees in a downstream market.  Following 
the seminal papers of Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), most models assume identical 
firms with constant marginal cost c>0 engaged in Cournot competition in a market with 
linear demand. (Kamien, 1992; Wang, 1998; Sen and Tauman, 2007)  The innovation 
is defined as a reduction in cost from c to ε−c , assuming c≤< ε0 .  All firms are 
assumed identical ex ante and it is also assumed that any firm can realize the same 
amount of cost-reduction ε  if it puts the innovation to use. 
 The case of ex ante cost asymmetries has been largely ignored.  Although the 
asymmetric case is much less tractable, there are at least three important reasons why it 
deserves attention.  First, perfect cost symmetry is unlikely in any real industry.  
Second, the assumption of perfect cost symmetry leads to auction equilibria in which 
potential licensees make identical bids, which then requires a random draw to allocate 
the license.  Some properties of such equilibria may arise from the tie-breaking rather 
than from substantive aspects of downstream competition.  In particular, as our 
analysis will show, findings (i) and (ii) above may be violated when firms are not 
identical.  Thirdly, including ex ante cost asymmetries in a model forces us to clarify 
the conception of a cost-reducing innovation by identifying and distinguishing specific 
ways in which a new technology may reduce production costs.  This is so because, if 
firms are not identical in terms of their ex ante costs, it is likely that they may also differ 
in the extent to which the innovation can reduce their costs.  
 We propose that the following three types of cost-reducing innovation may 
plausibly arise in a manufacturing industry and engender distinct strategic consequences 
for the allocation and pricing of licenses. 
  
Step-eliminating innovation.  Ex ante, the unit production cost is 0>ic  for firm i.  
The production processes used by the firms may differ, but each process includes a step 
that is common to all firms.  The cost of this common step is )(min ii c<ε  per unit.  
The innovation eliminates this step, thereby reducing the production cost of a licensee 
to ε−ic .   This type of innovation is congruent to the innovation assumed in most 
models of the strategic licensing literature cited above. 
 
New process innovation.  Ex ante, the unit production cost is 0>ic  for firm i.  The 
D.Rtischev / Gakushuin Economic Papers 45:4 (2009) 325-336 
 
 
 
4
innovation is a whole new process to produce the same output good at a per-unit cost 
)(max ii ce < .  To use the innovation, a licensee must abandon its previous process and 
replace it with the new process.  We will take up this case in detail in the following 
sections and show that licensing of a new process innovation is substantively different 
from licensing a step-eliminating innovation. 
 
General cost-reducing innovation.  Ex ante, the unit production cost is 0>ic  for firm 
i.  By adopting the innovation, firm i can achieve a unit cost ii ce ≤ .  Such 
firm-specific cost-reductions may arise if a particular input (e.g., electricity) is used by 
firms in different amounts and the innovation reduces the cost of procuring that input 
(e.g., new electricity generator).  Since cost-reductions are firm-specific, the gains to 
becoming a licensee and the losses from not becoming a licensee are also firm-specific.  
An auction to allocate a limited number of licenses to such an innovation is a special 
case of an auction with identity-dependent externalities, a difficult problem that has 
received some attention from auction theorists.  (see Aseff and Chade, 2008; Das 
Varma, 2002; Funk, 1996)  Applying the theory of auctions with interdependent 
valuations to the specific case of licensing appears to be a promising new direction. 
 
 In the remainder of the paper we analyze the licensing of a new process 
innovation and compare the results to the case of a step-eliminating innovation. 
 
3. Model 
 A Cournot duopoly producing undifferentiated goods faces inverse demand 
given by 2121 )( qqaqqp −−=+ , where qi is the quantity produced by firm }2,1{∈i , 
a>0 is a demand parameter, and p is the market-clearing price.  We assume that firms 
have positive costs and that firm 1 is more efficient.1  To focus attention on non-drastic 
innovations, we further assume that the inefficient firm would produce a positive 
amount even if the efficient firm were to succeed in reducing its unit cost to zero.  The 
following condition incorporates these assumptions about costs: 
2
0 21
acc <<<                     (1) 
We will use the following notation to denote the Cournot equilibrium profit of firm i as 
a function of its and rival’s unit costs:  
                                                  
1 To avoid repeating “more” and “less,” we will simply refer to firm 1 as “efficient” and firm 2 as 
“inefficient.” 
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1)|( jiji ccacc +−≡π  
where }2,1{, ∈ji  and ji ≠ .  Ex-ante profits of the duopolists will be denoted by 
)|( jii ccA π≡  and the ex ante cost difference by 12 ccc −≡Δ . 
 An independent inventor patents a new production process that can be used to 
produce the same goods more efficiently than the inefficient firm.  Specifically, the 
new process has a unit cost e < c2.  We distinguish innovations that are a breakthrough 
for the industry from innovations that can help the inefficient firm catch up, as follows. 
 
Definition.  A leading-edge innovation is a new production process with unit cost e 
that satisfies 10 ce <≤ . 
 
Definition.  A catch-up innovation is a new production process with unit cost e that 
satisfies 21 cec <≤ . 
 
 As the following analysis will show, the strategic consequences of licensing 
leading-edge and catch-up innovations are quite distinct. 
 
 
4.  Exclusive licensing via auction 
 The inventor may choose to hold an auction to allocate an exclusive 
zero-royalty license to the innovation.2  Each firm’s bid in the auction represents a 
per-period fixed fee the firm is willing to pay to become the exclusive licensee.  The 
auction is conducted as a sealed-bid second-price auction.  Let Wi represent the profit 
of firm i if it wins at auction, gross of the license fee it will have to pay.  Let Li 
represent the profit of firm i if it loses the auction.  Since the auction is second-price, it 
is optimal for each firm to enter a bid equal to its willingness-to-pay.  The firms thus 
bid iii LWb −= , the highest bidder becomes the licensee, and thereafter pays a license 
fee ),min( 21 bbF =  per period.  We can decompose the willingness to pay for the 
license into “use value” and “loss-prevention value.”  The use value of the license to 
firm i is ii AW − , since this is how much it can gain from using the new technology.  
The loss-prevention value is ii LA − , which represents the loss a firm will suffer if its 
rival gets the license. 
 
                                                  
2 We limit attention to zero-royalty fixed-fee licenses since such licenses have been shown to maximize 
outside inventor revenue under basic assumptions.  (Kamien, 1992) 
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4. 1  Exclusive licensing of a catch-up innovation 
 The efficient firm has zero use value for a catch-up innovation, since if it 
obtains the license, it would be most profitable to shelve the new technology and keep 
producing with the old process.  However, the efficient firm has loss-prevention value 
for a catch-up innovation, because by obtaining a license it can prevent its rival from 
becoming more efficient.  Specifically, the gross payoffs to the efficient firm from 
winning or losing the auction are: 
)|( 1
11
1
ecL
AW
CU
CU
π=
=
 
 The inefficient firm has zero loss-prevention value but positive use value for a 
catch-up innovation, since the inefficient firm loses nothing if the efficient firm licenses 
the innovation and then shelves it.  Specifically, after the auction the inefficient firm 
stands to earn one of the following gross profit levels: 
22
12 )|(
AL
ceW
CU
CU
=
= π
 
In the auction, the firms bid CUi
CU
i
CU
i LWb −= .  Regardless of which firm wins the 
license, the inefficient firm will not suffer a loss in net profit but the efficient firm will.  
The next proposition makes this precise. 
 
Proposition 1.  Allocation of an exclusive license to a catch-up innovation via an 
auction weakly increases the net profit of the inefficient firm and strictly decreases the 
net profit of the efficient firm. 
 
Proof.  The inefficient firm can retain its ex ante profit by bidding zero in the auction, 
letting the efficient firm win the license and shelve the new process.  Thus, if the 
inefficient firm chooses to make a positive bid, it must be for the purpose of obtaining a 
higher net profit in the case of winning the auction.  If the efficient firm wins the 
license, it shelves the technology.  Its profit from production remains unchanged but 
net profit falls by the amount of the license fee. ■ 
 
 Which firm wins the license leads to different consequences not only for the 
firms’ profits but also for consumer surplus and the source of inventor’s compensation.  
If the inefficient firm gets the license, the inventor appropriates part of the new profit 
the innovation brings to the licensee, but not any of its ex ante profit.  The lower cost 
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enjoyed by the licensee will lead to more output, lower price, greater consumer surplus, 
higher net profit for the inefficient firm, but lower profit for the efficient firm.  Thus, 
by licensing a catch-up innovation to the inefficient firm, the inventor ends up hurting 
the efficient firm indirectly, via competition in the output market, and ends up helping 
its direct client – the licensee – as well as downstream consumers.  However, if the 
efficient firm wins the license, there will be no change in quantities, prices, consumer 
surplus, or the inefficient firm’s profit.  The inventor will have simply appropriated 
part of its client’s ex ante profit – a pure transfer of an incumbent’s rent with no 
efficiency consequences. 
 Which firm will win the license to a catch-up innovation depends on the ex 
ante cost asymmetry and the size of the innovation.  The next three propositions 
specify the relevant conditions.  
 
Proposition 2.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry is larger than ),( 152 cac −>Δ  then any 
catch-up innovation will be licensed by the inefficient firm. 
 
Proposition 3.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry is smaller than ),( 151 cac −<Δ  then any 
catch-up innovation will be licensed by the efficient firm. 
 
Proposition 4.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry falls in the range  
),()( 152151 cacca −<Δ<−  then there exists a critical size of a catch-up innovation 
),( 21 cce∈  such that any more significant catch-up innovation ),( 1 ece∈  will be 
licensed by the inefficient firm and any less significant catch-up innovation ),( 2cee∈  
will be licensed by the efficient firm.  The critical size of a catch-up innovation is 
)582( 2151 ccae −+= .  The bigger (smaller) the ex ante cost asymmetry, the broader 
(narrower) the range of catch-up innovations licensed by the efficient firm.   
 
Proof.  The bids of the efficient and inefficient firms for an exclusive license to a 
catch-up innovation are, respectively, )|( 111 ecAb π−=  and 212 )|( Aceb −= π .  
From this it follows that 21 bb >  if and only if )582( 2151 ccae −+> .  Imposing the 
restrictions 1ce >  and 2ce < , and using the definition of ex ante cost asymmetry 
12 ccc −=Δ  leads to Propositions 2 through 4. ■ 
 
 The overall picture that emerges from these results is that a catch-up innovation 
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will end up being put to use by the inefficient firm only when the ex ante cost 
asymmetry is large enough and if the innovation promises a large enough cost reduction.  
Thus, only significant catch-up innovations in significantly asymmetric duopolies can 
be expected to end up in the hands of the inefficient firm and thereby reduce the cost 
asymmetry and increase consumer surplus.  Conversely, a sufficiently small ex ante 
cost asymmetry will be perpetuated in spite of any catch-up innovations offered for 
licensing by outside inventors.  Such inventions will be kept out of use by preemptive 
licensing by the efficient firm.  This implies that it is possible for a slightly more 
efficient firm to be driven to progressively lower profit levels by a series of outside 
inventors auctioning off catch-up innovations.  Considered in isolation, each such 
auction for a catch-up innovation makes it rational for the efficient firm to outbid the 
inefficient firm and then shelve the innovation.  However, by accumulating such 
licenses the efficient firm will progressively pay out more of its gross profit to the 
inventors, eventually ending up with zero net profit.3  We caution that the rationality of 
such preemptive licensing may be questioned in a model that allows firms to anticipate 
future innovations. 
 
4.2  Exclusive licensing of a leading-edge innovation 
  A leading-edge innovation has both use value and loss-prevention value for 
both firms.  Specifically, the gross payoffs to firm i from winning or losing the auction, 
respectively, are: 
)|(
)|(
ecL
ceW
i
LE
i
j
LE
i
π
π
=
=
 
For each firm, winning a license auction increases gross profit ( i
LE
i AW > ) whereas 
losing decreases it ( i
LE
i AL < ).   This win-or-lose situation is structurally similar to the 
case of a step-eliminating innovation that is the focus of most strategic licensing models 
cited earlier.  However, because the licensing of a new process to an asymmetric 
duopoly engenders different amounts of cost-savings for the two firms, there are 
equilibria different from those identified in the literature on step-eliminating innovations.  
Specifically, whereas in the case of a step-eliminating innovation the efficient firm 
always outbids the inefficient firm and thereby increases the cost asymmetry via 
licensing, the opposite outcome is possible in the case of a leading-edge new process 
                                                  
3 The same problem plagues most strategic licensing models that predict transfer of ex ante incumbent 
profits to the outside inventor via licensing auctions. 
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innovation.  The next three propositions make this precise. 
 
Proposition 5.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry is larger than ),( 152 cac −>Δ  then any 
leading-edge innovation will be licensed by the efficient firm. 
 
Proposition 6.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry is smaller than ),5( 152 cac −<Δ  then 
any leading-edge innovation will be licensed by the inefficient firm. 
 
Proposition 7.  If the ex ante cost asymmetry falls in the range  
),()5( 152152 cacca −<Δ<−  then there exists a critical size of a leading-edge 
innovation ),0( 1
* ce ∈  such that any more significant innovation ),0( *ee∈  will be 
licensed by the efficient firm and any less significant leading-edge innovation 
),( 1
* cee∈  will be licensed by the inefficient firm.  The critical size of a leading-edge 
innovation is )2)(5( 2181
* acce −+= .  The bigger the sum of the ex ante costs, the 
larger the range of leading-edge innovations licensed by the efficient firm.  
 
Proof.  Firm i bids for an exclusive license to a leading-edge innovation ),0( 1ce∈  in 
the amount of )|()|( ecceb iji ππ −= .  From this it follows that 21 bb >  if and only if 
)2)(5( 2181 acce −+< .  Imposing the restrictions 1ce <  and 0>e , and using the 
definition of ex ante cost asymmetry 12 ccc −=Δ  leads to Propositions 5 through 7. ■ 
 
 The overall picture that emerges from these results is that a sufficiently large ex 
ante cost gap will be widened by a leading-edge innovation.  However, if the initial 
cost asymmetry is not too large and the leading-edge innovation is not too significant, 
then the inefficient firm will license the innovation and leapfrog the efficient firm.  
Such leapfrogging is not possible when licensing a step-eliminating innovation, as the 
next proposition shows. 
 
Proposition 8.  Any step-eliminating innovation ),0( 1c∈ε  is licensed by the efficient 
firm. 
 
Proof.  Firm i bids for an exclusive license to the step-eliminating innovation in the 
amount of )|()|( επεπ −−−= jijii ccccb .  From this it follows that 
0221 >Δ=− cbb ε , which implies firm 1 wins the auction. ■ 
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In particular, if a step-eliminating innovation satisfies cΔ>ε , then potentially the 
inefficient firm could leapfrog its competitor if only it could obtain the exclusive license.  
However, according to Proposition 8, the efficient firm will outbid the inefficient firm in 
the auction and thereby widen the cost asymmetry.   
 
5.  Non-exclusive licensing of a new production process via price-setting 
 Instead of holding an auction to allocate an exclusive license, the inventor can 
set a price and offer a non-exclusive license to any firm willing to pay the price.  In 
this section, we consider the allocation of licenses and inventor revenue under such 
price-setting, and identify conditions under which the inventor prefers price-setting to 
auctioning. 
 
5.1 Licensing of a catch-up innovation via price-setting 
 An inventor choosing how to sell license(s) to a catch-up innovation would 
choose to hold an auction only for those innovations that would be won and shelved by 
the efficient firm.  If the auction would lead to licensing by the inefficient firm, the 
inventor could earn more by non-exclusive price-setting.  The next proposition makes 
this precise.  
 
Proposition 9.  If the inventor offers non-exclusive licenses to a catch-up innovation, 
then (i) the efficient firm will not buy a license at any positive price, and (ii) the 
inventor will earn higher licensing fees than via exclusive auctioning if the innovation 
satisfies conditions in Propositions 2 and 4 under which the inefficient firm wins the 
auction. 
 
Proof.   
(i) The efficient firm would not pay for a non-exclusive license since the use value is 
zero and loss-prevention value cannot be realized without exclusivity.   
(ii) If an auction for an exclusive license is won by the inefficient firm, then the firms’ 
bids must have satisfied 111222 bLAAWb =−>−=  and the license fee must be the 
smaller bid 11 LAF
E −= .  If instead of holding an auction, the inventor were to set 
the price slightly below 22 AWF
NE −= , then the inefficient firm would have bought the 
license, since doing so would raise its profit.  Since ENE FF > , the inventor would 
have earned more revenue.  ■ 
 
 Thus, it makes sense for the inventor to hold an exclusive auction for a 
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catch-up innovation only if the loss-prevention value for the efficient firm exceeds the 
use value for the inefficient firm.  Otherwise, price-setting is a more profitable way for 
the inventor to sell the license to the inefficient firm.  Even though price-setting 
potentially makes the innovation available to both firms on a non-exclusive basis, in 
effect the outcome is a single license to the inefficient firm. 
 
5.2 Licensing of a leading-edge innovation via price-setting 
 If both firms obtain a license to a leading-edge innovation, then each firm will 
earn a gross profit which we will denote by )|( eeB π≡ .  Figure 1 shows the firms’ 
payoff matrix in the price-setting licensing game in which the inventor first announces a 
license fee F per period and then each firm decides whether to buy a license or not.  As 
the following propositions establish, there are two candidate prices that the inventor 
must choose from when setting a non-exclusive license fee to a leading-edge 
innovation: either 112 LBF −=  or 222 AWF −= . 
 
 
                       Firm 2 
  Don’t buy  Buy 
Firm 1 
Don’t buy   A1   A2   L1  W2–F 
Buy W1–F  L2 B–F  B–F 
 
Figure 1.  Payoff matrix of the game in which each firm decides whether to buy a 
license at the price F per period set by the inventor. 
 
Lemma 1.  For any leading-edge innovation ),0[ 1ce∈  and any cost and demand 
parameters satisfying (1), Cournot profits gross of the license fee satisfy all of the 
following inequalities: 
(i) 121212 WWAALL <<<<<  
(ii) 22 WBA <<  
(iii) 1122 AWAW −>−  
(iv) 122 LBAW −>−  
 
Proof.  Inequalities (i), (ii) and (iii) follow from the definitions of the Cournot profit 
functions.  To prove (iv), we note that the equation 122 LBAW −=− reduces to 
0))(()2( 122121
2 =−−−+−+ ccccaecce , which has no real roots in e. Thus 
)( 122 LBAW −−−  as a function of e is a parabola with no zero-crossings.  Therefore, 
for all e, either 122 LBAW −>−  or 122 LBAW −<− .  When e = c1, 
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122 LBAW −>− ; therefore this must hold for all e. ■ 
 
Proposition 10.  The highest price an inventor can set such that both firms will buy a 
license to a leading-edge innovation is 112 LBF −= .  Both firms will suffer a decrease 
in net profit as a result of buying a license at this price. 
 
Proof.  From the payoff matrix in Figure 1, it can be seen that (Buy, Buy) is a Nash 
equilibrium of the price-setting licensing game if and only if 1LBF −<  and 
2LBF −< .  According to Lemma 1(i), 12 LL < .  Therefore,  1LBF −<  is the 
binding upper limit on the license fee.   After the firms purchase licenses at this price, 
each firm’s net profit will be 11)( LLBB =−− , which is less than A1 and A2 by Lemma 
1(i). ■ 
 
Proposition 11.  The highest price an inventor can set such that exactly one firm will 
buy a license to a leading-edge innovation is 222 AWF −= .  This price will induce 
only the inefficient firm to become a licensee.  The licensee’s net profit will be the 
same as ex ante; non-licensee’s profit will be lower than ex ante. 
 
Proof.  From the payoff matrix in Figure 1, it can be seen that (Don’t buy, Buy) is a 
Nash equilibrium of the price-setting licensing game if and only if 22 AWF −<  and 
1LBF −> .  Such a fee F exists by Lemma 1(iv).  Next, we need to confirm that the 
inventor cannot obtain a higher license fee in the (Buy, Don’t buy) equilibrium.  (Buy, 
Don’t buy) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 11 AWF −<  and 2LBF −> .  
According to Lemma 1(iii), the upper bound on F in this equilibrium is below that of 
the (Don’t buy, Buy) equilibrium.  Finally, ex post profits in the (Don’t buy, Buy) 
equilibrium with the price 222 AWF −=  are 11 AL <  for firm 1 and 
2222 )( AAWW =−−  for firm 2. ■ 
  
The next proposition identifies conditions under which the inventor prefers to 
set the license fee aiming to license both firms, and conditions under which the inventor 
prefers to set the fee so as to license only the inefficient firm. 
 
Proposition 12.  An inventor who uses price-setting to sell licenses to a leading-edge 
innovation maximizes licensing revenue by setting the fee to 112 LBF −= , and thereby 
licensing both firms, if 12 2cc <  and ]2,0[ 21 cce −∈ .  Otherwise (i.e., if 12 2cc > , or 
12 2cc <  and ),2( 121 ccce −∈ ), the inventor maximizes licensing revenue by setting 
the fee to 222 AWF −=  and thereby licensing only the inefficient firm. 
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Proof.   The inventor can set the price to attract either one or both firms.  
Propositions 10 and 11 establish the highest price possible for each case.  Inventor’s 
maximum revenue from licensing both firms is 122F , which exceeds the maximum 
revenue from licensing one firm 2F  iff 221)(2 AWLB −>− .  This inequality reduces 
to 2121 2 cceacc −<<−+ .  Applying assumption (1) constrains e to the range 
2120 cce −<< . ■ 
 
Finally, we consider conditions under which an inventor of a leading-edge 
innovation earns more via exclusive auctioning than via non-exclusive price-setting.  
As the next proposition establishes, if price-setting results in licensing only a single firm, 
the inventor can earn more revenue by instead holding an auction for an exclusive 
license. 
 
Proposition 13.  If licensing a leading-edge innovation via price-setting would result in 
licensing only one firm, the inventor can earn more revenue by instead auctioning off an 
exclusive license. 
 
Proof.  If 12 2cc >  or if 12 2cc <  and ),2( 121 ccce −∈ , then, according to 
Proposition 12, the profit-maximizing price is 222 AWF −= , only the inefficient firm 
buys, and the licensing revenue is F2.  An auction for an exclusive license would yield 
)(min
2,1 iii
LW −
= in licensing revenue, which exceeds F2 according to Lemma 1(i). ■ 
 
 As can be easily verified with a numerical counter-example, the converse of 
Proposition 13 does not hold.  Thus, in cases when price-setting would result in both 
firms buying a license, the inventor may or may not find it more profitable to instead 
auction off an exclusive license.  Unlike in models with identical firms licensing a 
step-eliminating innovation, the inventor in our model does not necessarily earn more 
via exclusive-license auctioning than via non-exclusive price-setting. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 We began by inquiring into how the usual theoretical definition of a 
cost-reducing innovation may be interpreted in the context of a typical manufacturing 
industry, and whether there are other plausible kinds of cost-reducing innovations.  We 
have outlined a brief typology of cost-reducing innovations that distinguishes 
step-eliminating, new-process, and general cost-reducing innovations.   We then 
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focused on the licensing of a new process innovation, keeping track of its two 
sub-types: leading-edge and catch-up innovations.  The licensing equilibria that we 
have derived are substantively different from those in previous studies focused on the 
case of symmetric firms licensing a step-eliminating innovation.  We have shown that 
when firms with different ex ante costs engage in a game to allocate a license to a new 
process via auction or price-setting, outcomes that have been ruled out in many strategic 
licensing models become possible.  In particular, the relatively inefficient firm may 
catch-up to and even leapfrog its rival, price-setting without quantity restrictions may 
yield higher licensing revenue to the inventor than auctioning off a restricted number of 
licenses, and the licensee does not necessarily end up with less net profit than ex ante. 
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